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Abstract 
This article reviews research on policy attitudes and ideological values from the 
perspective of social representations theory. In the first part of the paper, key features 
of lay political thinking are presented, its pragmatic imperative, its focus on 
communication and the social functions of shared knowledge. Objectification 
transforms abstract and group-neutral ideological values into concrete and socially 
useful knowledge, in particular stereotypes of value-conforming and value-violating 
groups. Such shared understandings of intergroup relations provide citizens with 
common reference knowledge which provides the cognitive and cultural basis of 
policy attitudes. Social representations theory further suggests that lay knowledge 
reflects the social context in which it has been elaborated (“anchoring”), an aspect 
which allows conceptualising aggregate-level differences in policy attitudes. In the 
second part of the paper, a model of lay conceptions of social order is outlined which 
organises four shared conceptions of social order, along with the stereotype-based 
thinking associated with each conception: Moral order, Free Market, Social diversity 
and Structural inequality. We conclude by arguing that policy attitudes are symbolic 
devices expressed to justify or to challenge existing social arrangements.  
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Policy Attitudes, Ideological Values and Social Representations 
In democratic societies it often seems that citizens are not well equipped to take an 
informed stance towards important social and political issues (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) 
and that considerable variation in citizens’ political expertise hampers effective participation 
in democratic debate (Converse, 2000). Taking a perspective of lay political thinking, the 
present article puts such alarmist claims into perspective. It argues that most citizens are 
actually aware of political alternatives, but not necessarily in their expert formulations. They 
know the kind of society they are attracted to and the models of society they oppose, in terms 
of its level of cultural diversity, individual freedom or social equality, for example. Citizens 
express such preferences in attitudes and opinions towards a wide range of social, economic 
and legal policies that are destined to achieve political goals, for example the upholding of 
public order or the reduction of economic inequalities. Accordingly, policy attitudes refer to 
individual evaluations concerning the desirability and legitimacy of different models of 
society. 
The present contribution offers a social psychological approach to policy attitudes 
from the perspective of political lay thinking, with a focus on the influence of ideological 
values on policy attitudes. The discussion of policy attitudes and values is built upon social 
representations theory which provides a conceptual framework of lay thinking and everyday 
communication (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue, 2006; Deaux & Philogène, 2001; Doise, 
Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Moscovici, 1961/2008; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). We first 
consider research on ambivalent political attitudes and highlight the social and relational 
foundations of ideological values. In the second part of the paper, we outline a model of lay 
conceptions of social order which links multiple ideological values with social psychological 
processes.  
Attitude Ambivalence, Value Pluralism, and Social Representations 
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People often hold contradictory political attitudes. Such attitudinal ambivalence is 
one of the major issues in policy attitude research (Cantril & Davis Cantril, 1999; Feldman & 
Zaller, 1992). Studies have shown, for example, that people support abstract egalitarian 
principles, while advocating at the same time policies that are contrary to egalitarian 
principles, for instance tax breaks for the wealthy or cutbacks in unemployment protection 
(Feldman & Zaller, 1992). Similarly, citizens easily endorse broad principles such as human 
rights, but they equally easily support specific policies which violate human rights, for 
example in case of torture of a suspected terrorist (Staerklé & Clémence, 2004). And while 
public agreement with a general principle of solidarity is generally found to be high, this 
support crumbles when specific groups such as the unemployed are mentioned as 
beneficiaries (Kangas, 1997). Such apparent inconsistency has been viewed as reflecting 
ideological innocence (Kinder & Sears, 1985), a schizoid combination of values (Free & 
Cantril, 1968), or as the result of missing political information and awareness (Converse, 
1964). In light of such widespread ambivalence and inconsistency, many researchers in 
political science and beyond bemoan the lack of principled, value-based, higher-order 
understanding of complex political phenomena by ordinary citizens (e.g., Zaller, 1992). 
Converse (1964), in particular, argued that attitudes of the general population are notoriously 
uninformed, inconsistent and ambivalent, whereas attitudes of the elite are more informed and 
more consistent, because they are based on higher order political reasoning. Relying on 
models of cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958), consistency between values 
and attitudes has therefore been viewed as a sign of informed political reasoning and 
cognitive sophistication (Converse, 2000; Zaller, 1992). 
An alternative view suggests that attitudinal ambivalence and apparent inconsistency 
are part and parcel of the contemporary political culture, characterised with a large array of 
competing values and models of social organisation (Hochschild, 1981). This can be 
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exemplified with a value conflict that has frequently been evidenced in policy attitude 
research: values denoting self-reliance and meritocratic achievement versus values of social 
justice and relative equality between citizens. This ambivalence is viewed as a conflict 
between capitalism vs. democracy (McClosky & Zaller, 1984), the protestant work ethic vs. 
egalitarianism-humanitarianism (Katz & Hass, 1988), or freedom vs. equality (Rokeach, 
1973). Ambivalent attitudes that refer simultaneously to these two sets of attitudes are not 
necessarily indicative of confusion, inconsistency or lack of sophistication, but rather reflect 
“a problem of reconciling the multiple values, beliefs, and principles simultaneously present 
in the political culture” (Feldman & Zaller, 1992, p. 270). Such value pairs represent socially 
constructed and shared knowledge which are presumably present in any democratic society as 
“ideological dilemmas” (Billig, 1989) and as a pluralistic public sphere (Jovchelovitch, 2007). 
They convey ideological reference markers which feed and orient lay political thinking 
(Young, 2007). Consequently, inconsistent and ambivalent attitudes may merely reflect the 
fact that citizens constantly refer to opposing values when making up their opinion, and may 
even indicate higher “integrative complexity” (Tetlock, 1986). This value pluralism is the 
background on the basis of which citizens develop policy attitudes. Citizens are embedded in 
a political culture that is made up by widely shared ideas circulating in society—social values, 
beliefs, ideologies—which can be seen as “social representations” (Moscovici, 1961/2008) 
that help people to make sense of their social life and to take a stand towards the existing 
social order.  
Social representations theory argues that lay thinking does not follow the same rules 
as expert thinking (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983). Lay thinking obeys 
to a “pragmatic imperative” (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Reasoning in terms of abstract 
categories is of little use to cope with everyday life contingencies, and most citizens rather 
rely on concrete everyday experience to make up their minds on political issues (Augoustinos 
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et al., 2006). Political lay thinking is pragmatically elaborated in order to come to terms with 
concrete everyday issues and to be able to act upon the social world (Reicher, 2004). This 
view also implies that the relationship between ideological values and policy attitudes 
depends on the specific social context, for example a policy domain, in which it is enacted. 
The social representations approach also highlights the importance of social 
communication (Moscovici, 1961/2008; Jovchelovitch, 2007). When citizens are intrigued by 
a social issue—be it criminality, unemployment, immigration or inequality—they are likely to 
attend to relevant media reports and discuss the matter within reference groups, for example 
with friends, family and colleagues. Exposed to distinct points of view and contrasting 
ideological values, individuals take up a position on the basis of shared reference knowledge 
(Clémence, 2001). Shared knowledge makes communication and debate within a social 
context possible, and thus regulates relations within groups and communities. At the same 
time, shared knowledge, beliefs and values differentiate one social context from another, 
thereby creating social identities, for example when group norms are reproduced in social 
judgements (Clémence, 2001) or when policy attitudes and ideological values are shared by 
members of social categories (Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni & Roux, 2007). Shared knowledge 
both represents and creates the social context in which it is developed, thereby exemplifying 
the anchoring process in social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961/2008). 
Ideological Values as Models of Social Relations 
In this view, reference to abstract ideological values such as justice, equality or 
humanitarianism does not necessarily reflect higher order reasoning (Feldman & Zaller, 
1992), since such values enter people’s lives precisely through everyday communication and 
experience. Shared values necessarily emerge from social life, from the ongoing 
communication in private life and from debate in the public sphere (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The 
values of individualism and meritocratic achievement, for example, are conveyed by the 
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widely disseminated everyday belief that hard work is a “good” thing, that laziness is “bad”, 
and that people should get rewarded according to their efforts and their merits. Equality 
values, in turn, might be communicated through the widespread biblical idea according to 
which people should treat others as they would like to be treated themselves. Values can 
therefore be viewed as “cultural truisms”, that is, beliefs that are widely shared and rarely 
questioned (Maio & Olson, 1998). 
In order to convey meaning to abstract philosophical principles, lay thinking 
transforms ideological values into shared, normative models of social relations. Values of 
traditionalism and authoritarianism, for example, stress the relationship between conforming, 
“good” citizens, and non-conforming, potentially dangerous and “bad” citizens. Values of 
individualism and meritocratic achievement, in turn, emphasise competitive relations between 
“winners” and “losers”. Values of diversity and multiculturalism highlight intergroup respect 
and positive group differences, whereas values of universalism and equality underscore 
cooperative group relations and intergroup solidarity. Children gradually become aware of 
such “values”, not in their abstract and principled form, but as discursive themes and cultural 
frames through which they make sense of the social relations around them (Fiske, 1991). 
Abstract values should therefore not be confounded with cultural common sense and taken-
for-granted knowledge of which almost everyone living in a given political culture is aware. 
This relational view of values has implications for the interpretation of the 
construction of policy attitudes. People take up and justify their stance towards policies by 
referring to normative relational models rather than to abstract values (Staerklé et al., 2007). 
Individuals who score high on traditionalist or authoritarian values, for example, are likely to 
view their social world through the lens of a relationship between “good” and “bad” people 
and thus to support repressive policies which control and punish “bad” people. Individuals 
who think that society should be organised as a function of a competitive relation between 
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“winners” and “losers”, in turn, should support meritocratic policies which promote such a 
competitive relationship. 
The idea that values reflect heuristics to describe relational models between 
individuals and groups places a greater emphasis on the relational and contextual nature of 
values than the original conceptualisations which see values as enduring and context-
independent beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct and end states of existence that 
transcend specific objects and situations (Rokeach, 1973). Yet, there is a large body of 
research in which values are explicitly viewed as heuristics describing social relations. 
Sidanius and his colleagues have suggested that conservatism is motivated by a desire for 
group based dominance, the value of conservatism thereby becoming a normative model of 
hierarchical relations between groups (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 
1996). Emphasizing its role as a key belief system underlying policy attitudes, self-declared 
and measured conservatism has been shown to predict a wide range of policies which 
maintain or increase inequality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In this view, 
“legitimising beliefs” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) also represent ideological values, since they 
contain normative statements about the organisation of social relations, for example the idea 
that discrimination between groups is no longer a problem (also a component of symbolic 
racism, Henry and Sears, 2002), that equal opportunity between citizens is a reality rather 
than an ideal, or that ignoring group differences will lead to greater social harmony (Glaser, 
2005). 
Objectification of Values: Stereotypes and Policy Attitudes 
The analysis of the relational foundations of values can be taken a step further by 
arguing that values implicitly incorporate stereotypical images of those groups who are seen 
to conform to important values and those groups who are thought to violate these same 
values, a process termed judgemental value expression by Henry and Reyna (2007). Research 
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has shown that conformity with important values such as self-reliance, hard work and 
discipline is associated with social groups located at upper levels of the social hierarchy, 
whereas perceived non-respect of these values is associated with groups at lower levels of the 
social structure, exemplified by fat people (Crandall, 1994), welfare recipients (Gilens, 1999), 
women and Blacks in the U.S. (Biernat, Vescio, Theno & Crandall, 1996; Federico & 
Sidanius, 2002; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher & Tucker, 2005). This research shows how lay 
thinking associates ideological values with social groups in order to put forward a political 
stance. 
From the perspective of social representations theory, abstract knowledge such as 
ideological values is transformed into politically useful and functional everyday knowledge 
through the process of objectification (Moscovici, 1961/2008). Through this process, values 
are objectified into stereotypes of value-conforming and value-violating groups, a 
phenomenon which can be observed with any value which prescribes desirable and 
appropriate conduct and ways of being. The value of democracy, for example, is objectified 
into stereotypes of democratic and non-democratic countries (Staerklé, Clémence & Doise, 
1998; Staerklé, 2005), while the value of self-control is transformed into representations of 
people “in control of themselves” versus those who lack control (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007). 
Survey research on welfare attitudes, in turn, has shown that perceived deservingness emerges 
as a central motivation to justify one’s policy attitude: the less potential beneficiaries are 
perceived as deserving in terms of their compliance with social values such as the work ethic, 
the less individuals support policies in their favour (van Oorschot, 2006). Policy judgements 
based on perceived deservingness of beneficiaries lead to conditional solidarity in which 
egalitarian values may be supported in the abstract, but do not apply to groups perceived as 
undeserving. And even researchers themselves are not immune against this tendency of 
objectifying values into stereotypes. In Feldman and Zaller’s (1992) seminal analysis of social 
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policy attitudes, statements referring to laziness of the poor were considered to reflect 
ideological and principled reasoning about “individualism”. From a political lay thinking 
perspective, however, such derogatory images represent widely shared and age-old 
stereotypes of the poor, culturally invoked to justify subordinate positions in society 
(Geremek, 1994).  
Stereotypes and prejudice towards beneficiary groups thus provide an important link 
between abstract ideological values and policy attitudes. Contrary to claims that policy 
attitudes are mainly determined by “group-neutral” ideologies and values such as “principled 
conservatism” (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997), ideological values, when viewed as building 
blocks of political lay thinking, cannot be group-neutral (Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles & Goff, 
2006; Reyna et al., 2005). They predict policy attitudes not because of their disinterested 
philosophical meaning, but because they have become associated with groups symbolising 
conformity and non-conformity with these values. Values therefore implicitly provide the 
cognitive content upon which stereotypes and prejudice develop. This process may explain 
why prejudice and racism are important driving forces behind policy attitudes (Federico & 
Sidanius, 2002). Symbolic racism, for example, has been shown to trump other explanatory 
factors in accounting for attitudes towards “racial policies” such as welfare and affirmative 
action policies (Gilens, 1999; Sears, van Laar, Carillo & Kosterman, 1997) or crime 
regulation policies (Green, Staerklé & Sears, 2006). Augoustinos et al. (2006) forcefully 
summarise the political function of stereotype-based policy judgements: “An ‘attitude’ of 
dislike or disdain of the poor, of the unemployed, of people of a different class, of people of 
different colour, serves not only to orient the individual to that particular social object, but 
also to position that object, be it a person or a group, in social space. This helps to explain, 
as well as justify and reproduce, the social system which produced those social positions, and 
to defend the individual’s own social position.” (p. 140). Relating stereotype content to 
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ideological values thus represents a strategy to account for the political functions of 
stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981; Pratto & Pitpitan, 2008). 
A Model of Lay Conceptions of Social Order 
So far, our discussion of policy attitudes from the perspective of political lay 
thinking suggests that citizens develop policy attitudes on the basis of value pluralism, and 
that they express preferences for a certain social order through policy attitudes. People take up 
a position in a symbolic network of stereotype content (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007), made up by 
representations of social antagonisms between value-conforming categories (deemed to 
represent the bedrock of the social organisation) and value-violating categories (perceived to 
threaten the social order). Policy attitudes are therefore based on stereotypical images of 
groups. These images may be strategically deployed to justify policies destined to deal with 
value-violating, disturbing or threatening groups (Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997). Social 
policies are thus viewed as institutional means to regulate the relationship between 
subordinate and dominant, or between threatening and conforming groups.  
A model of lay conceptions of social order brings together these features of political 
lay thinking. This model as well as its empirical foundations are fully developed elsewhere 
(Staerklé et al., 2007). Like Schwartz’s (1992) universal value structure, it is intended to 
systematise multiple values into a single conceptual model and link the different values to 
distinct social psychological processes. And like Relational models theory (Fiske, 1991), the 
model aspires to account for the relational foundations of ideological values by specifying 
representations of four emblematic relationships. It departs from these models by assuming 
that the basic psychological process underlying political lay thinking is differentiation (Tajfel, 
1981), and that antagonisms between groups and individuals representing contrasting values, 
or differential value conformity, are at the core of democratic politics (Mouffe, 1993) and thus 
of political lay thinking. 
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As shown in Table 1, the model describes two basic forms of differentiation: 
normative differentiation occurring within groups and categorical differentiation occurring 
between groups (see Kreindler, 2005). In the process of normative differentiation, people 
believe that social cleavages are the outcome of deliberate, individual actions, and that the 
meaning of these actions can be assessed with respect to perceived conformity with important 
ingroup values. The process of categorical differentiation, in turn, is based on representations 
of differences between groups and categories which are related to each other through 
antagonistic intergroup relations.  
Differentiation requires a comparison dimension on which groups and individuals 
are perceived to differ. In contrast to social identity theory which emphasises the flexible 
selection of comparison dimensions as a function of comparative context (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979), this model focuses on the psychological processes determined by the actual content of 
two general types of comparison dimensions: a first one based on moral, cultural and non-
quantifiable attributes which defines processes of recognition, and the second one based on 
material, tangible and quantifiable attributes which gives rise to processes of redistribution 
(Isin & Wood, 1999). The crossing of these two polarities—normative vs. categorical 
differentiation on the one hand and recognition and  redistribution on the other—yields four 
conceptions of social order: Moral order, Free market, Social diversity and Structural 
inequality (see Table 1). The overall ambition of the model is to provide an account of four 
representative ways of thinking about the social order. 
Each of these types describes a set of representations derived from a particular 
normative model of social order. Similar to Max Weber’s ideal types of behaviour, these four 
conceptions do not describe any particular society; rather, they are simplified representations 
of four ways of organising a society, along with their main modes of institutional regulation 
and their core antagonisms. The model describes how policy attitudes are shaped by four 
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types of stereotypical thinking which can be assessed with measures of prejudice towards (1) 
deviant and non-conformist individuals, (2) undeserving individuals who take advantage of 
others’ work, (3) immigrants and outgroups, and (4) low-status groups and organisations 
defending an egalitarian social order. By specifying an emblematic antagonism justifying 
different types of social order, the model seeks to account for the pluralism of stereotypical 
thinking which guides policy attitude construction. In line with classical work on social 
representations (Doise, 1990; Moscovici, 1961/2008), the model assumes a homology 
between social and cognitive regulation such that the conceptions of the social order are at the 
same time “in the heads” and “in the world”. The model also presents a fourfold typology of 
social domains regulated by policies: public order, labour market, diversity, and inequality. 
Our assumption is that specific social psychological processes are associated with each of 
these four policy domains. Let us now briefly look at each of these types of social order. 
In the conception of Moral order, political lay thinking follows along the lines of 
morality and conformism with established and consensual norms. Much like in Talcott 
Parsons’ (1951) functionalist sociology or in Amitai Etzioni’s (1994) conservative 
communitarianism, social order is explained with citizens’ respect for common values: the 
“good” citizens are those who respect and represent the core values of the society, whereas 
those who disrespect them, with deviant, non-conformist and disorderly behaviour, are 
categorised as “bad” citizens who threaten the social order. In this conception, individuals are 
assumed to strive for recognition through value conformity. Accordingly, the policy goal is to 
enforce value assimilation and strengthen conformity with social rules and norms, through 
disciplinary and repressive government intervention. The moral order conception is captured 
in values of traditionalism and authoritarianism which bemoan the moral decline, glorify the 
“good old days” (Eibach & Libby, 2009), and stress the duty of group members to conform to 
conservative ingroup values of morality, self-reliance and discipline (Duckitt, 1989). Based 
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on representations of a “dangerous world” full of “bad” people (Duckitt, 2001), it reflects 
authoritarian modes of thinking, characterised by endorsement of dominant group norms, 
intolerance of deviance, and submissiveness to authorities (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt, 1989). 
Research on retributive justice and attitudes towards punitive and repressive policies appeals 
to processes of moral order, showing for example that perceived threat to the social order, 
operationalised with a high number of unresolved crimes, increases punitive policy attitudes 
(Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock & Scott, 2004), or that a perceived decline in the moral consensus 
about right and wrong shapes attitudes towards punitive policies such as the three-strikes 
initiative (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). 
The Free market conception, in turn, describes political lay thinking based on 
economically liberal principles. Social order is thought along meritocratic principles and 
citizens are evaluated as a function of individual performance and success. Individuals are 
expected to engage in competitive relations with each other and endorse the equity principle 
of distributive justice according to which retributions, in form of salary for example, should 
be proportional to contributions and personal investment (Walster, Walster & Berscheid, 
1978). Free market thinking assumes that the basic human motivation is self-interest, one of 
the most influential cultural norms in contemporary Western societies (Miller, 1999). 
Accordingly, policies are implemented to promote principles of meritocratic achievement, for 
example active unemployment policies (van Oorschot, 2004). Values of economic 
individualism (see Kinder & Sanders, 1996) capture free market thinking. The threat to a 
social order governed by free market principles stems from individuals who violate its core 
principles: free-riders and “losers”. People perceived to misuse welfare benefits are a 
particularly likely target of stereotypical judgements as are welfare beneficiaries in general, 
suspected to take advantage of other members’ hard work and thus to be a burden to other 
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group members. Researchers have invoked this conception to study for example the effects of 
perceived deservingness on policy attitudes (e.g., Appelbaum, 2001; van Oorschot, 2006). 
 
Table 1 
Model of lay conceptions of social order 
 RECOGNITION REDISTRIBUTION 
NORMATIVE 
DIFFERENTATION 
MORAL ORDER FREE MARKET 
Regulatory principle Conformism Competition 
Ideological value Authoritarianism, Traditionalism Individualism, Meritocracy 
Stereotypical antagonism “Good” vs. “Bad” “Winners” vs. “Losers” 
Policy domain Crime regulation, Public order Labour market, Employment 
   
CATEGORICAL 
DIFFERENTATION 
SOCIAL DIVERSITY STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 
Regulatory principle Group differentiation Group hierarchy 
Ideological value Multiculturalism vs. Racism Equality vs. Inequality 
Stereotypical antagonism Ingroup vs. Outgroup Dominant vs. Subordinate groups 
Policy domain Group rights, Affirmative action Social welfare 
 
The conception of Social diversity differs from the two preceding conceptions to the 
extent that political lay thinking relies upon ascribed group membership and an a priori 
distinction between social groups rather than between groups defined by individual conduct 
(as is the case for the antagonisms between “good” and “bad” people and between “winners” 
and “losers”). The regulatory principle of social order at work in the social diversity 
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conception is group differentiation (Doise, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It thereby provides a 
conceptual framework for accounting for lay thinking on social diversity and 
multiculturalism, in both positive and negative terms (Verkuyten, 2004). On the policy level, 
group rights (or cultural rights) are at stake in this conception. If the two former conceptions, 
moral order and free market, call for individual rights (and duties) granted irrespective of 
group membership, the conception of social diversity accounts for situations in which social 
groups claim rights in the name of their group, both minority and majority groups (see Isin & 
Wood, 1999). The social diversity conception can be measured for example with scales 
tapping multicultural (van de Vijver, Breugelmans & Schalk-Soekar, 2008) and racist values 
and beliefs (Henry & Sears, 2002). Stereotypical judgements in this conception are based on 
the evaluation of perceived categorical difference between groups defined with physical, 
cultural or historical qualities, often associated with essentialised and immutable qualities 
(Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 2000; Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1997). According to social 
identity theory, such thinking based on group membership is likely to develop in contexts 
where people strongly identify with their group and where their social identities are salient 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
The Social diversity conception is more complex than the moral order and free 
market conceptions, because group differences can be evaluated as either positive, for 
example in multiculturalism and in movements defending rights of particular groups, or 
negative, as in racist and discriminatory thinking and behaviour. In the case of a positive view 
of intergroup differences, the social order is based on a diversity-friendly recognition and 
valorisation of ethnic, cultural, sexual, or religious difference between groups. To the extent 
that group membership is officially recognised as a cause of unequal treatment and 
discrimination, group differences provide the foundation of affirmative action policies and 
group rights. Studies investigating the role of racism and prejudice on attitudes towards 
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affirmative action policies, for example, draw upon this conception (Bobocel, Son Hing, 
Davey, Stanley & Zanna, 1998; Federico & Sidanius, 2002), as does research on differences 
in policy attitudes between (ethnic) minorities and majorities (Staerklé, Sidanius, Green & 
Molina, 2009). In the case of a negative view of intergroup differences, social order is based 
on privileges granted to members of the (ethnic) majority group. Accordingly, the threat to a 
social order based on majority rights stems from categorical otherness, represented in 
particular by ethnic and national outgroups, foreigners, immigrants and asylum seekers. 
Exclusionary, discriminatory and nationalist policies implement such negative social diversity 
principles. A vast field of research investigating attitudes towards racial policies (see Kinder 
& Sanders, 1996; Sears, Sidanius & Bobo, 1999) and exclusionary immigration and 
integration policies (Green, 2009; Scheepers, Gijsbert & Coenders, 2002; Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004) calls upon this facet of the Social diversity conception. 
In the final conception, lay political thinking is structured by group hierarchy, that is, 
by Structural inequalities. Here, social order is thought to be governed by deterministic 
patterns of class-based inequality resulting in a social hierarchy of status and power. Class 
differences are seen as the result of social reproduction and inherited privileges rather than as 
the outcome of individual strivings (e.g., Bourdieu, 1979). Policies in this conception regulate 
social inequalities, in particular redistributive tax policies and social welfare programmes. 
This conception is therefore mostly concerned with (opposition to) social rights which grant 
individuals with decent and dignified living conditions (Roche, 2002). The stereotypical 
cleavage characteristic of this conception is the distinction between underprivileged, 
subordinate groups on the one hand, and privileged, dominant groups on the other. Much like 
in classic Marxist analyses, these groups are seen as being in a competitive relation of 
negative interdependence with each other: the demands by low status groups directly threaten 
the well-being of the high status groups (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). 
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Again, this conception is complex to the extent that structural inequalities can either 
be perceived as legitimate and fair, or on the contrary as illegitimate and unfair. When the 
inequalities are seen as legitimate and even desirable, individuals are likely to endorse 
strategies of justification of these inequalities, by promoting “legitimising myths” which 
provide a rationale for the superior position of the dominant groups (Jost et al., 2004). As a 
result, individuals assert and defend superiority of those in privileged positions by supporting 
hierarchy-enhancing policies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In this view, a hierarchical social 
order dominated by powerful groups is threatened by organised groups which defend 
egalitarian principles and aim to attenuate the social hierarchy, for example trade unions. By 
extension, the threat stems also from low status groups collectively defending their rights. 
However, when inequality is deemed illegitimate, citizens support inequality correcting 
policies which are destined to redistribute wealth and opportunities, for example progressive 
tax policies.  
Implications: Organising Principles, Meaning and Causality 
The model of lay conceptions of social order organises ideological knowledge and 
thereby defines the organising principles of political lay thinking. At the same time, the four 
conceptions of social order provide the building blocks of political lay thinking. Its four-fold 
dimensionality allows a fine-grained analysis of individual differences anchored in group 
processes (Duckitt, 1989; Kreindler, 2005). It is therefore both a model of individual 
differences and of shared, cultural knowledge concerning the different ways of organising a 
society. 
Although the four conceptions are theoretically separate from each other, they are by 
no means impermeable. In most instances processes representing the four conceptions of 
social order mingle and combine in various ways, thereby giving rise to the extraordinary 
complexity of political lay thinking. As an example, research investigating the role of racism 
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in the support of punitive policies (Green et al., 2006) links racists representations derived 
from the social diversity conception with support for punitive policies implementing moral 
order principles. More generally, the model allows investigating value ambivalence by 
analysing the six possible value pairs resulting from the combinations of the four conceptions. 
The model thus provides a flexible tool to account for value pluralism and its effects on policy 
attitudes.  
The model is also a heuristic device to study the relationship between thought 
content and thought process.  In line with social representations theory, the meanings 
associated with actual thought contents condition the psychological processes at work. 
Therefore, the model is not primarily intended to predict causal links between its components. 
It rather represents a heuristic model which defines the different meanings associated with 
categories and concepts which are open to debate and interpretation. Equality, for example, 
takes on different meanings depending on the conception of social order it is referred to: in 
the moral order conception, prescriptive equality expects citizens to conform equally to the 
same dominant ingroup norms; equality of opportunities  is central in a free market 
conception; equality of treatment of different groups is a cornerstone of the social diversity 
conception; and equality of resources between social categories is a central feature of the 
structural inequality conception. Similarly, stereotypes of immigrants vary as a function of the 
conceptions: in moral order, immigrants are seen as dangerous and threatening, in free 
market, they are lazy profiteers of welfare benefits, in the social diversity conception they 
represent essentialised, cultural otherness, and in the structural inequality conception they 
make up a subordinate social category dominated by ethnic majority groups. Future research 
needs to establish the extent to which such different meanings associated with one particular 
concept determine policy attitudes. 
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Moreover, the model may clarify some of the theoretical and methodological 
confusion in prior research regarding the boundaries between ideological values and policy 
attitudes. Policy attitudes are often used as indicators of some larger underlying attitude 
construct; egalitarianism, for example, has been measured with attitudes towards policies 
limiting excessive wage disparities (Kluegel & Smith, 1986), and authoritarianism with 
attitudes towards punitive policies (Altemeyer, 1998). Social values and ideologies as 
measured by survey instruments are thus often inferred from policy attitudes which suggests 
that they cannot be treated as epistemologically distinct constructs (as advocated by research 
which claims that political thinking invoking abstract values is more sophisticated than 
thinking on concrete everyday issues; Converse, 2000). This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that no consistent link between political sophistication and value-based reasoning has 
been evidenced (Feldman & Zaller, 1992). As a result, one should be cautious in asserting 
causal relationships between cognitive constructs which are all based on social 
representations and shared lay knowledge (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). 
The model nevertheless suggests that certain relations among its components can be 
analysed as a causal sequence in order to explain policy attitudes. The model assumes that 
threats specific to each type of social order (e.g., crime and insecurity in the moral order 
conception) should heighten the salience of the respective stereotypical antagonisms (e.g., 
between good and bad people) which then determine the policy attitude (e.g., support for 
punitive policies). According to the model, the concepts of perceived threat, antagonism and 
policy attitude are qualitatively different: perceived threat captures perceptions of general 
problems a society has to face, antagonisms are based on perceived normative and categorical 
differences, and policy attitudes require a political decision (that is, they refer to “votable” 
issues). Due to its emphasis on stereotypical representations of group relations, this view is in 
line with models which consider prejudice and stereotypes as determinants of policy attitudes 
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(Bobo, 2000; Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Lowery et al, 2006; Sears et al., 1997). It also 
suggests that in order to understand why ideological values predict policy attitudes, it is 
necessary to analyse values in ways that make explicit their role in enhancing stereotypical 
antagonisms and value-based prejudice.  
Anchoring of Conceptions and Policy Attitudes 
In this final section, we briefly outline some of the factors which determine the 
extent to which individuals endorse the four conceptions of social order, either measured as 
perceived threats to social order, as perceived antagonisms or as policy attitudes. It should 
first be noted that all four conceptions may provide ideological justification for policies which 
maintain various aspect of social status quo: the moral order conception favours repressive 
policies which threaten dissent and democratic contestation, the free market conception 
supports meritocratic policies which put less competitive individuals at a disadvantage, the 
social diversity conception legitimises discriminatory and racist policies, and the structural 
inequality conception promotes inequality enhancing policies. Based on research showing that 
insecurity and instability bolsters cultural worldviews which provide a sense of stability (van 
den Bos, 2009), we could expect that the maintenance of status quo through all four policy 
domains is enhanced by feelings of uncertainty, vulnerability and precariousness. This 
prediction can be extended to status differences with respect to conceptions of social order. 
Research has shown that subordinate groups typically express higher levels of prejudice 
against other low status groups (Wagner & Zick, 1995), that they feel more threatened by 
various social problems (Staerklé et al., 2007), and that they score higher on some 
legitimising beliefs, for example meritocratic achievement and the value of hard work (Jost, 
Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003). These effects point towards strategies of downward 
social comparison that members of subordinate groups may engage in, thereby expressing a 
heightened perception off the various social order threats and the corresponding stereotypical 
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antagonisms. Differentiating themselves from stigmatised groups such as welfare 
beneficiaries, asylum seekers or unruly youth provides the opportunity to affirm their relative 
superiority on appropriate dimensions of comparison. At a societal level, however, 
stigmatising consensual targets of public scorn is a strategy of justification of a social order 
that seeks its legitimacy in the exclusion of groups portrayed in the media and in political 
discourse as threatening the social order (Young, 1999).  
Privileged groups in turn are also likely to endorse these status quo supporting 
beliefs, albeit for different reasons. Whereas members of subordinate groups engage in 
strategies to deal with a negative social identity associated with their low status in society 
(Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), members of dominant groups 
are more likely to be motivated to secure their privileges (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thereby, 
differential policy attitudes reflect the fact that people in privileged positions do not have the 
same interests with respect to the social organisation as those in subordinate positions. 
These considerations suggest that individual variations should be investigated with 
respect to the significance of each conception regarding status quo maintenance and social 
change. For the four conceptions are not equivalent in this respect: moral order and free 
market conceptions are by definition status quo enhancing, since they are based on normative 
differentiation and value conformity, thereby legitimising and enforcing dominant majority 
values. Within these two conceptions, dissent can only be interpreted as deviance from 
common values, thereby making it illegitimate. Subordinate groups are likely to endorse these 
conceptions because they provide a platform of positive differentiation against non-normative 
groups and individuals. Dominant groups, in contrast, support them because it allows 
cementing social arrangements which produced their privileged position in the first place. 
Social change therefore necessarily (and maybe paradoxically) requires conceptions of the 
social order which are based on categorical differentiation, that is, social diversity and 
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structural inequality. It is indeed only in these conceptions that an awareness of illegitimate 
intergroup relations (characterised by discrimination, domination and exploitation) can be 
developed, denounced and eventually corrected. 
If subordinate groups look after their group interests, they do so in order to correct 
inequality which in their view is illegitimate: women, for example, support unconditional 
maternity leave more than men, not only because they are the main beneficiaries of this 
policy, but also because the lack of maternity insurance creates inequality between men and 
women (Staerklé, Roux, Delay, Gianettoni & Perrin, 2003). Similarly, members of 
subordinate groups in general are more supportive of egalitarian and redistributive social 
policies (Kangas, 1997; Staerklé et al., 2007; Svallfors, 2006). By collectively defending their 
interests against dominant groups, subordinate groups draw upon an upward social 
comparison in order to condemn the perceived injustice (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001).  
This brings us back to the issue of political attitude ambivalence. Members of 
subordinate groups often simultaneously support egalitarian policies and endorse hierarchy-
enhancing ideologies such as economic individualism and meritocracy. For political experts, 
these two sets of attitudes are contradictory, since egalitarian policies are hierarchy-
attenuating, whereas meritocratic ideologies justify inequality. Sociological analyses may 
help to shed light on this apparently paradoxical pattern. Bourdieu (1979) has shown that 
members of social categories adopt ways of thinking and perceiving social reality which 
reflect their social position. In line with our argument that political lay thinking is anchored in 
the particular social contexts in which it is developed, subordinate groups typically develop a 
pessimistic outlook on society, they may revel in a past when things seemed better (Eibach & 
Libby, 2009) and they don’t have much hope that their situation could fundamentally improve 
(Castel, 1995). Such a vision of society may lead to resentment towards groups who are 
believed to be responsible for the moral decay of society (e.g., immigrants, homosexuals or 
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delinquents), or toward groups thought to take advantage of good citizens and honest workers. 
At the same time, however, members of subordinate groups expect the government to do 
something for them. Only government intervention can guarantee a minimal standard of 
living (with appropriate social policies) and thus contribute to ease fears about an uncertain 
future. Members of dominant groups, in turn, display more optimistic and carefree attitudes 
(Staerklé et al., 2007).  They are in a better position to cope in economically difficult times, 
and have a lower risk of being unemployed for a long time (Paugam, 2000). They enjoy a 
relatively positive social identity, and are more concerned with securing their privileges than 
with boosting their identity with comparisons with stigmatised groups. 
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the position in the social structure is 
a key factor in explaining (apparent) attitude inconsistency: subordinate groups are more 
prone to attitudinal ambivalence because they expect more hierarchy attenuation and 
government protection, while struggling at the same time to enhance their negative social 
identity with ideological strategies which may clash with the support for hierarchy attenuating 
government intervention. This conclusion is consistent with research on attitude ambivalence. 
Politically liberal groups who advocate more social intervention by governments display more 
attitudinal ambivalence than conservative groups (Feldman & Zaller, 1992), left wing citizens 
show more cognitive complexity and integration by referring to multiple ideological values 
and tradeoffs (Tetlock, 1986), and ambivalent attitudes towards government are more 
frequent among people who feel less secure financially, compared to the financially secure 
(Cantril & Davis Cantril, 1999).  
Conclusion 
The present paper approached policy attitudes and their variations from the 
perspective of political lay thinking. Based on social representations theory, we have argued 
that attitude ambivalence was actually a manifestation of political lay thinking which 
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continually seeks ideological reference points in order to make sense of the political world. 
Political lay thinking transforms, through the process of objectification, abstract ideological 
values into stereotypical representations of value-conforming and value-violating groups. In 
this view, citizens are competent enough to take up a stance towards policies, be it only on the 
basis of a hazy preference for a certain type of social order. Everyday political knowledge is 
not less informed, less sophisticated, less deep than expert political knowledge; it is 
qualitatively different and follows different rules, in particular the requirement that 
knowledge must be useful for everyday communication and action within one’s reference 
groups. The anchoring process describes how citizens think politics in and out of the social 
relations they are embedded in. The end product of this process are the four conceptions of 
social order which represent divergent, yet shared representations of citizenship. 
In this view, policy attitudes become symbolic tools with which citizens either 
provide legitimacy to existing social relations or challenge them. In a democratic society 
values and policies are always debated and debatable, since they represent different and often 
incompatible political goals (Mouffe, 1993). Policies implement certain types of social order 
which are questioned, contested, or approved by citizens. Such policy debates are likely to 
revolve around the four shared understandings of social order—Moral order, Free market, 
Social diversity and Structural inequality—which continuously feed and orient lay political 
thinking. 
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